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Uncanny Survivors and the Nazi Beast:  
Monstrous Imagination in See Under: Love 
MIA SPIRO    
In a 2007 interview with the Paris Review, David Grossman observes how Jewish discourse 
remains overshadowed by the Holocaust: 
Jews, in every language they speak, will talk about “what happened there.” To 
ask what happened then means it was and it is over. For Jews, in a tragic way, 
it’s never over. It exists somewhere parallel to our life, it’s an alternative 
option.1  
This “parallel” or “alternative option” continues to preoccupy not only Jewish speech but also 
Jewish writing, as contemporary authors grapple with the legacy of the Holocaust and its 
effects on Jewish experience. One of the many ways that writers have articulated this type of 
haunting presence is through the symbolic use of uncanny, fantastic figures, such as ghosts, 
monsters, beasts, and mythic beings. Especially in the past three decades, disembodied spirits 
of Nazi monsters and ethereal survivors have become recurring motifs in Holocaust 
narratives.2 Think, for instance, of the golems in Michael Chabon’s The Amazing Adventures 
of Kavalier and Klay (2000) and Thane Rosenbaum’s Golems of Gotham (2002), or even the 
haunting presence of the dybbuk in Rebecca Goldstein's Mazel (1995). The events and 
actions surrounding these undead beings often break with temporal, spatial, and even 
linguistic boundaries of otherwise realist historical plot lines. As salient metaphors for the 
vexed relationship between Jewish past and present, monstrous creatures demand that readers 
examine what it means to be human in a post-Holocaust universe, a universe that has 
exhibited an extreme capacity for inhumanity, and a world in which the past never entirely 
goes away. Such creatures also serve often as uncomfortable reminders of the difficulties in 
representing the effects of the Holocaust through imaginative means.  
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David Grossman’s See Under: Love—especially its renowned first chapter, 
“Momik”—is one of the most effective Holocaust narratives to employ a monster motif. As 
Or Rogovin has discussed at length, imagery of monsters and devils was applied to Nazis for 
decades in Israeli public discourse and educational texts.3 Holocaust memoirs are replete with 
references to Nazi perpetrators such as the “Beast of Buchenwald” Ilse Koch or “Angel of 
Death” Josef Mengele. Recent popular novels such as Louise Murphy's The True Story of 
Hansel and Gretel (2003) also rely on these stereotypes. Grossman, by contrast, responds to 
these constructions and reworks them. The “Nazi Beast” and eerie survivors in the novel self-
consciously call into question the strategies writers and readers use when wrestling with ideas 
about postwar trauma. What are the ethical and aesthetic implications of using monsters as a 
vehicle to respond to Nazi evil and the horror of the Holocaust? Moreover, what is gained or 
lost by using such an overdetermined symbol as a “beast” to grapple with the equally 
overdetermined constructions of both perpetrators and traumatized survivors?  
To investigate these questions, it is important to observe how monsters function in 
literature more generally. To begin with, as a literary device, monsters demonstrate (from 
monstrare) the inadequacy of our terms of categorization for what is or what is not human. 
As Jeffrey Jerome Cohen emphasizes in his theory of monsters, as cultural symbols monsters 
are “harbingers of category crisis.” They indicate what lines cannot be crossed by humans in 
terms of behavior; yet, externally their indistinct and “incoherent” form—hybrids of human 
and inhuman parts, suspended between life and death— threatens to disturb easy 
classifications of self and Other. As Cohen elaborates, “because of its ontological liminality, 
the monster appears at times of crisis as a kind of third term that problematizes the class of 
extremes.”4 Monsters, in other words, exceed rational boundaries that determine what is 
normal/human. But they also threaten binary thinking by introducing a new category that 
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refutes easy classification. Monsters are, in Cohen’s terminology, a third term, “difference 
made flesh.”5 
A disturbing disruption of categories marks the treatment of the Holocaust in See 
Under: Love. Grossman's novel provides key examples of how the “Nazi Beast” serves to 
embody the fear and anxiety that come with the slippage between past and present, blurred 
boundaries between victim and monster, and reality and the literary imagination, not only in 
Israel but also in post-Holocaust culture more widely. Many of the ambiguities and slippages 
are highlighted through the viewpoint of a naïve child protagonist, Shlomo Efraim Neuman, 
known as Momik. In the first section of the novel, which takes place in Israel in 1959, Momik 
is nine years old, the child of survivors, in a Jerusalem neighborhood inhabited by adults with 
various stages of postwar neuroses. Through a misunderstanding of the euphemisms and 
fragmented speech that his parents and other adults use to recount the past, Over There 
[sham] in Europe, Momik obtains a distorted view of what happened during the Holocaust. 
Despite the protagonist's naïveté, as Naomi Sokoloff has pointed out, the “narrated 
monologue” that Grossman uses to uncover the child’s point of view also “reveal[s] 
exceptional insights on the youngster’s part.”6 One of the most perceptive of Momik’s 
observations is that something so frightful that it cannot be named—what the adults call the 
“Nazi Beast” [haḥaya hanatsit]—lies at the source of the immense pain suffered by those 
around him. He thinks that the Nazi Beast is “some imaginary monster or a huge dinosaur 
that once lived in the world which everyone was afraid of now. . . . Over There, a place you 
weren’t supposed to talk about too much, only think about in your heart and sigh with a 
drawn-out krechtz, oyyy.”7 Bella, the grocery store owner, the only person who tries to 
answer all his questions, tells him “some really important things” about how to find the 
monster when “she let it slip out that the Nazi Beast could come out of any kind of animal if 
it got the right care and nourishment” (13). The boy’s loss of innocence happens when he 
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attempts to create his own Beast in the cellar of his home, believing that he will then be able 
to tame it and free his family from their angst and sadness. Momik at first traps small 
animals--a kitten, a turtle, a raven, and a hedgehog--and keeps them in cages in the cellar, 
waiting for the Nazi Beast to "come out." He then moves onto people, Jewish survivors, to 
bait the Beast, without success. Finally, Momik suffers emotional collapse. 
Not the Holocaust itself, but its impact as an independent, uncanny presence manifests 
itself as beastly in the postwar context of the novel through both survivors and Momik, the 
next generation. Above all, See Under: Love suggests that the Nazi Beast is not “Over There” 
in Nazi-occupied Europe, but overwhelmingly present for Momik and the characters that 
surround him. Yet, while the symbolism that links evil and Nazi perpetrators to the Beast is a 
strong component in Momik's conception of the Beast, the more monstrous elements in the 
novel are contained in those characters who have to deal with the effects of the Shoah: the 
survivors themselves, with their unhealthy influence on the child. In this way, not only does 
the Nazi Beast blur boundaries between past and present by being ever-present for survivors; 
in addition, the fear and anxiety related to the Beast also stem from the way the monstrous 
past has turned its victims, humans, into fractured, ghostly—and ghastly—uncanny beings. 
The neighborhood is filled with disturbed characters who have not managed to emerge 
successfully from the nightmare of traumatic memory: a woman who runs naked in the street, 
homeless men who talk to themselves, and people with numbered codes on their arms. 
Momik’s parents are notably described in the most monstrous of terms. At night, they cry out, 
terrorizing Momik as they relive their own nightmares. As victims they have transformed into 
creatures out of a horror film for their young son. Much like vampires, they come to the boy’s 
bedroom: “their eyes devoured him, and even though Momik could actually feel himself 
being devoured, he just stood there quietly and let them do it because he knew that was what 
they needed” (48). Supper is an equally voracious episode because “Mama and Papa chew 
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with all their might. They sweat and their eyes bulge out of their heads and Momik pretends 
to be eating while he watches them carefully. . . . He only tastes what’s on the tip of his fork, 
but it sticks in his throat because he’s so nervous” (48). Small wonder Momik suffers a 
breakdown. 
 The ambiguity of the monster symbolism, the sophistication of Grossman’s literary 
technique, and the complexity of the message about the effects of the Shoah are only some of 
the elements that have made the novel so influential. As Gershon Shaked aptly predicted 
when he reviewed the novel in 1989: “This is a book about which seminar papers and 
doctoral dissertations will be written.”8 The multivalence enriches the text as it helps the 
novel challenge the idea that Nazis were radically Other. That kind of othering leads to 
evading the opportunity, and perhaps the ethical responsibility, to understand human nature. 
Nevertheless, the ambiguity as to who/what is the actual monster—the memory of the Nazi 
Beast or its traumatized victims— is problematic. For one thing, Grossman risks perpetuating 
unjust stereotypes of survivors. In a posting to the H-Net listserv for History of the Holocaust 
in 2011, psychologist and Holocaust scholar Hank Greenspan remarked:  
The vision of survivors as guilty, ghostly, and afraid—what I call the 
“psychiatric discourse”—has persisted alongside . . . celebratory discourse. It 
is no less distorting, presumptuous, and—however unintentionally—cruel. . . . 
Survivors become convenient symbols of our own hopes and dreams and, in 
oscillation, of our deepest revulsions and fear.9  
One might ask if Grossman’s monstrous, uncanny survivors can be categorized as examples 
representing “psychiatric discourse.” As manifestations of the monster motif, the survivors in 
the novel do indeed appear as disturbing vehicles for distressing postwar anxieties. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, See Under: Love makes a strong comment about the 
potential for “any kind of animal” (13) to become monstrous. Clearly, this idea is contentious 
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because it fails to draw important ethical distinctions between those who choose to do evil 
and those who maintain a sense of humanity even in extreme situations.10 Indeed, some 
readers were offended with Grossman’s suggestion that everyone has an LNIY “little Nazi in 
you.” While the lines separating human and Beast are vague, so are the categories that 
separate us as readers from Holocaust victims. That is, Grossman's self-conscious, ironic use 
of the monster motif draws attention to the fact that there is no “them” for “us” to project 
distinctions upon, whether it is survivor or Beast. Yet, if both Momik and the survivors 
become beastly at various points in the novel, the reader’s identification and sympathy is 
nevertheless with them, their stories, and their humanity, rather than with the Nazi 
perpetrator.  
This element of identification with the victims and survivors is what makes See 
Under: Love's monster motif very different from the monster motif in a novel such as Michel 
Tournier’s The Ogre (1970). The explorations of human nature and its potential for 
inhumanity are poles apart in the two works. Tournier also uses a “Beast” trope to challenge 
the binary thinking that distinguishes “us” from the Nazi mythic monster. Like Momik, 
Tournier’s naïve protagonist goes through a process of hunting down the Nazi Beast to 
understand him. However, Tournier explores how Nazi perpetrators could comply with 
orders that were inhumane and cruel by presenting the novel from a distinctive point of view: 
the perspective of the perpetrator. Abel Tiffauges is a French garage owner who tells the 
story of his past and life during World War II in a memoir called The Sinister Writings of 
Abel Tiffauges. Tiffauges’s diary goes from describing a rather un-monster-like unhappy 
childhood, to being drafted into the French army; he then escapes a prisoner-of-war camp to 
work eventually for the Third Reich, recruiting boys for a Nazi Youth elite school. In a rather 
humdrum progression, he learns to hunt pigeons, then deer, then children. The diary ends in 
the spring of 1945 and, a few days after Tiffauges finishes writing the last page, we are told 
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by the omniscient narrator that he will die trying to save a Jewish boy, a survivor of 
Auschwitz, during the Soviet invasion of East Prussia. 
 The title of the novel in French, Le roi des aulnes (The Erl-king), alludes to an ironic 
relationship between mythic monstrosity and the reality of human evil that Tournier explores. 
At the very start of the novel, Abel Tiffauges, in a somewhat removed and overly intellectual 
way, reflects on his being a monster and its meaning: 
To begin with, what is a monster? Etymology has a bit of a shock up its sleeve there: 
monster comes from monstrare, to show. A monster is something which is shown, 
pointed at, exhibited at fairs, and so on. . . . If you don’t want to be a monster, you’ve 
got to be like your fellow creatures, in conformity with the species.11 
Tiffauges, however, seems to be confused as to what a monster is. He refers to it as “the 
Other” a nonconformist. But the novel asks: what if “to conform” to others is outrageous? 
What if the surrounding people are monsters? The question concerning Nazi monstrosity and 
evil then becomes more acute as the plot progresses through the beginning of the war in 1938 
until the demise of the Third Reich in 1945.  
 The comparison between Tournier’s text and Grossman’s brings to bear the fine 
ethical line that is easily crossed when employing the Nazi monster trope. Both authors 
similarly employ a combination of a naïve protagonist’s point of view and an omniscient 
narrator to create irony, alienate the reader, and show the distance between reality and the 
characters' perspectives. The effect in both is to highlight the irrationality of using mythic 
constructions of good vs. evil to understand Nazism. At the same time because the only 
viewpoint (and therefore empathy) the reader is privy to in The Ogre is the perpetrator’s, the 
narrative becomes an ethically ambiguous project. It is this same ethical problem—focusing 
on the perpetrator to understand the nature of inhumanity—that was raised by critics when 
Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the “banality of evil” was published following her coverage of 
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the Adolf Eichmann trials in Israel in 1961 for The New Yorker.12Arendt’s well-known 
observations speculated that Eichmann, despite being responsible for the organized 
deportation and extermination of the Jews, refuted what society usually perceives as a 
monster. According to her view, Eichmann was neither Iago nor Macbeth; as she sardonically 
states, “He merely never realized what he was doing.”13 Jewish intellectuals like Gershom 
Scholem, who felt she was belittling the nature of Nazi aggression, were not mollified when 
Arendt later explained further: “It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never 'radical,’ that it 
is only extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. . . . Only the 
good has depth and can be radical.”14 Tournier’s construction of Abel Tiffauges is a precise 
illustration of Arendt’s model of “banality.” Tiffauges's acts of villainy are not especially 
profound, while his final act of sacrificing himself to save the Jewish Auschwitz survivor is 
indeed extraordinary in its greatness and mythic proportions. In stark contrast, Grossman 
depicts a beast that is indeed radical: it is grotesque, it is demonic, and it is unfathomable--not 
necessarily because of its nature, but because of the painful and devastating effects it has on 
its victims.  
 Momik's connection to Anshel Wasserman, his great-uncle, ties together the various 
complex strands of what “the Beast” means in this story. A famous writer in the past, Anshel 
was presumed to have been killed by the Nazis, but in fact has been in an insane asylum for 
the past decade. When he arrives one morning in an ambulance to be claimed by Momik's 
family, he is neither dead nor altogether alive: Anshel is broken, his eyes are blank, he doesn't 
hear, and he talks incomprehensibly to himself. Momik's great-uncle, or “Grandfather” 
Wasserman, as he calls him, quite literally brings the horror of the past into Momik's present 
by embodying its incomprehensibility; he is a figuration of that “category crisis” and failure 
of rationality to explain the past. In many ways, Anshel is the antithesis, or inverse, of the 
Nazi Beast. As a victim of the monster, he provides the most compelling evidence that the 
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Nazi Beast exists. He is a character that is otherworldly enough to take on mythical meanings 
and constructions, not unlike the Nazi Beast. In this regard, he more closely represents what 
Eric Santner calls the creaturely, a “caesura . . . in the space of meaning . . . [an] uncanny loci 
of alterity within the order of meaning.”15 Anshel, more than any other character, challenges 
readers to rethink what it means to be human by existing at the margins of existence; he is a 
“creature” but made up of enough fragmented human elements to convince Momik that there 
is indeed a person inside. Anshel thus embodies the frightening outcome of that “parallel” 
reality that Grossman mentions in the Paris Review interview quoted above, in which he 
posits that the possibility of being a Jewish victim “exists somewhere parallel to our life, it’s 
an alternative option.”16  
 It is specifically Anshel’s arrival from the insane asylum that prompts Momik “to find 
the Beast and tame it and make it good, and persuade it to change its ways and stop torturing 
people and get it to tell him what happened Over There and what it did to those people” (30). 
Momik accordingly leads Anshel down to the cellar to bait the Beast with “a real Jew, 
someone who actually came from Over There” (68). Notably, the boy does not necessarily 
identify himself as a Jew; for Momik, both “real Jew” and “Beast” are equally linked as 
imagined constructs from the past. As readers, we understand how Momik’s naïve 
misunderstanding of “a real Jew/victim” reveals the same type of narrow binary thinking that 
constructs the Nazi Beast. Momik’s behavior in the cellar nevertheless blurs distinctions 
between his own life and the parallel, victimized life that Grandfather Wasserman epitomizes. 
The narrator tells us that “Momik holds Grandfather's hand and feels the warm currents of 
Grandfather's story flow into his own hand and up to his head” (71). He and Anshel also “sit 
on the floor together, eating pieces of dry bread, as Momik softly sang partisan songs, in both 
Hebrew and Yiddish, and recited prayers from Papa’s High Holiday prayer book” (80). The 
boundaries between Momik and Grandfather Anshel become distorted as the boy relives the 
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past in the older man's place, singing for him, praying instead of him, and absorbing his 
traumatic past. When it appears that Grandfather Anshel is "too small to bring out the Beast" 
(81), Momik decides to bring the other Jewish survivors down to the cellar, people who 
would "be so Jewish [the Beast] won't know what to do with itself" (83). By this time, 
Momik's family's cellar has become a den of horrors, and Momik himself is on the edge of 
sanity--for he begins to know what it is to be cruel. He has starved and tortured animals 
locked in the cellar and taped gruesome pictures of the Holocaust, copied from library books, 
onto the walls. The cellar echoes with the shrieks and sounds of howling animals, trauma 
victims, and Momik himself (38-39). 
 Aptly, Momik both does and does not find the Nazi Beast. In the monster's lair he 
creates in the cellar, Momik finds the Beast within himself--the rage, the hatred, and the 
cruelty. Yet, as he approaches that knowledge, the nine-and-a-half-year-old Momik fails to 
grasp what that means. Momik figures “that what he needed in order to fight the Beast was 
the very thing that most scared it . . . to get to know more about the Beast and its crimes, 
because otherwise he’d just be wasting energy no matter what he did” (65). Getting to know 
the Beast nevertheless proves too much for Momik, as it proved too much for Anshel 
Wasserman. Knowledge of the monster, as the novel implies, destroys. The depiction of 
events leading up to Momik’s psychic break is one of the most compelling and heartbreaking 
comments on the after-effects of the Holocaust on both survivors and their children. Momik 
has kept notebooks; he reads, writes, and listens to stories about the Shoah, but, quite 
literally, he cannot digest that same knowledge. He “squeezed his head because he didn't 
think he could stand it anymore, he wanted to vomit everything . . . everything he'd learned 
about lately, including himself” (84-85). This is why, when Momik hears the stories of his 
uncle and the other survivors, he cannot remember them:  
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[Momik] heard Grandfather humming his tune in the silence like an electric 
pole, only this time the story sounded clear and he told it nicely with biblical 
expression, . . . and when Grandfather finished telling it, the others started 
telling their stories, and they were all talking at once and they said things no 
one would ever believe, and Momik remembered them forever and ever and 
instantly forgot them. . . . (84) 
Although Momik becomes a witness to untold survivor testimonies, he fails to keep details. 
The knowledge of the Holocaust’s monstrous effect on humans is too much for him to bear, 
because the human capacity to understand evil—or even to find analogies for such radical 
inhumanity—is always provisional. As Grossman self-consciously implies, the crude nature 
of literary analogues of the Holocaust makes it impossible to record accurately the impact of 
devastation this event wrought. In this way, Grossman draws our attention to potent questions 
about Holocaust representation and the literary imagination more broadly: how far must a 
writer go in imagining the reality of the Holocaust before it becomes “too much”? What are 
the limits of representation for both writers and readers? As Alvin Rosenfeld suggests, “what 
inevitably emerges in Holocaust literature is that such analogies are introduced only to reveal 
their inadequacy, as they are in turn either refuted or rejected as being unworkable.”17 
 And yet, tragically for Momik, his parents, and the other survivors, the mythic Nazi 
Beast cannot be eradicated. For it is the nature of all monsters that they never completely 
disappear: Dracula, Frankenstein, the Yeti, the Golem—each one can be revivified in a 
different time or place, set against the particular cultural anxieties of the period. The Nazi 
monster exists, as a projection of such fears, and stems from the knowledge that human 
beings can not only cross a line into the unthinkable, but that such inconceivable depths of 
cruelty happened in our time. The monster lives on, not only in 1950s Israel, but more 
generally for contemporary Jews, survivors, their children, and grandchildren, for whom what 
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happened “Over There” is not over. Even though the Beast is unknowable, the one thing that 
perhaps can be known is the elements of humanity that are able to exist in the wake of 
devastation. For, if the Beast in See Under: Love embodies the trace from Over There that 
challenges ideas of normalcy, it also reminds readers that it is still possible to preserve a 
sense of humanity in the shadow of monstrosity. As Grossman suggests in the same 2007 
interview with the Paris Review quoted above, each person, when considering the Shoah, 
should ask himself or herself: “In the face of such total arbitrariness, how can I maintain my 
uniqueness as a human being? What in me cannot be eradicated?”18  
Theology and Religious Studies, University of Glasgow 
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